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1 Introduction
In many countries (Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, France, etc.) cap-
ital gains are taxed at a lower rate than ordinary income, but there is no
unanimously supported theorectical explanation for this phenomenon. Some
argue that capital gains occur unexpectedly, and thus it is unfair to tax them
at the same tax rate as ordinary income because capital gains require taking
on additional risk. In addition to that, there is disutility from abstaining
from current consumption. Opponents of lower capital gains tax rates argue
that other kinds of income have a risk component as well. Furthermore, disu-
tility from taking on a job is not necessarily less sacricing than disutility
from investing.
Another justication for reduced capital gains tax rates is that preferential
tax treatment is needed in order to stimulate more investment and capital
growth. However, a reduction in the dividend tax rate reduces the cost of
equity nancing and thus can also increase investments. The debate between
these two policy alternatives is particularly relevant since the introduction
of the Job Growth and Taxpayer Relief Reconciliation act of 2003 in the
United States, that introduced dividend and capital gain tax changes (see,
for example, Poterba, 2004). One result of these debates is that without
taking other factors into consideration rather than taxes it is di¢ cult to
give an advantage to either point of view given that both dividends and
capital gain represent returns on equity investments and both are important
for equityholders. In addition note that a social planner is not concerned
about increasing investments as much as possible but rather about attaining
an optimal level of investments. It is not clear why the latter cannot be
achieved when dividends and capital gains are taxed equally.
This paper does not rely on fairness or temporary policy objectives. It
builds on Chetty and Saez (2005) who argue that more Principal-Agent mod-
els are needed in order to understand how a di¤erence in capital gain taxation
and dividend taxation a¤ect the rm investment policy. We argue that if cap-
ital gains and dividends are taxed equally rms underinvest due to managers
moral hazard problem in using available free cash. Reducing the tax rate on
capital gains may improve societal welfare by increasing the equilibrium level
of investments.
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2 Model.
Consider a rm with an investment project available. The amount of earnings
generated by the project depends on the amount of investment. If the rm
invests i, the project will return a cash ow of r(i), r0  0, r00  0, r(0) = 0.
Initially, the rm pocesses an amount c of cash available. The rm belongs
to an entrepreneur who owns 100% of the rms equity. The entrepreneur
hires a manager who makes the investment decision. Everybody is assumed
to be risk-neutral and the risk-free interest rate is normalized to zero. The
managers reservation payo¤ is w0. Besides investment in the project, the
manager can decide to invest in other (ine¢ cient from the rms point of
view) projects. This moral hazard problem or agency problem (in this case it
can also be called the free cash ow problem) is well documented in existing
theoretical and empirical literature (see, among others, Jensen (1986) and
Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003)). More specically we assume
that if the manager has an amount of funds e available he has a choice
between i and b such that e = i + b and b is the amount of funds invested
ine¢ ciently. For simplicity it is assumed that b increases the managers
utility by the same amount. This can represent utility from giving the job
to family members, friends and other benets from investment in socially
ine¢ cient projects. A direct control of managers actions is impossible so the
entrepreneur cannot prevent the manager from investing ine¢ ciently. The
managers decision depends on its contract. We assume that the entrepreneur
and manager should determine a xed initial payment w to the manager,
w  c and a fraction a of earnings generated by the main project belonging
to the manager. The higher a is, the more incentive the manager has to
invest e¢ ciently.
The rm exists for two years. In the rst year the rm makes all decisions
about the project (the sequence of events is described below) and earnings
from the project are generated in year 2. After the project is completed and
earnings are generated the entrepreneur may either sell their shares in the
rm or to liquidate the rm and distribute dividends. Also, the entrepreneur
may sell his shares at the end of period 1 before investment is made. Divi-
dends will be taxed with the ordinary tax rate and capital gain (in case the
entrepreneur decides to sell shares) are taxed with capital gain tax rate. Let
td be the ordinary income tax rate and tc be the tax rate on capital gains.
The entrepreneur faces the following trade-o¤. High dividends in year
1 may reduce the managers "entrenchment" problem (since it reduces the
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amount of cash on which the manager has discretion) but, on the other hand,
it can also reduce the amount of investments in the e¢ cient project.
The sequence of events is as follows. Year 1. The rm gets cash c and
an investment project. The entrepreneur o¤ers a contract (w; a) to the man-
ager. The game is over if the manager rejects the o¤er (the managers gets
his reservation utility w0; the rm does not undertake the project; the en-
trepreneur is stuck with initial cash c). Otherwise the manager is hired and
gets w. The entrepreneur determines the year 1 dividends d1 (an alternative
sequence can be considered where dividends are determined before the man-
ager is hired. Although this is technically plausible because the managers
role is limited to making the investment, in reality the manager exists all the
time. This changes nothing in the solution). The manager determines i and
b, i + b = c   w   d1. Year 2. Project generates earnings r(i); the manager
gets ar(i); the entrepreneur determines the year 2 dividends d2 and sells the
rms shares.
The rst-best choice of i maximizes r(i)   i. Thus socially optimal in-
vestments i is determined by:
r0(i) = 1 (1)
We assume
r(i) > c > i + w0 (2)
meaning that rstly the rm has su¢ cient funds to cover the optimal invest-
ment needs and secondly the projects net present value is positive.
Before beginning the formal solution let us present the outline of the
major ideas. If there is no moral hazard and the manager invests only in
the e¢ cient project (b is always equal to 0) then the entrepreneur should
retain an amount of earnings i and distribute the rest as dividends. An
optimal contract for the manager is just xed initial payment w0. Since
the entrepreneur holds 100% of the project earnings he does not have any
incentive to retain an amount of earnings di¤erent from i. In the model
with moral hazard the key problem is the entrepreneurs year 1 dividend
decision. When the capital gain tax equals the ordinary income tax rate, the
entrepreneur will anticipate the managers moral hazard problem, and will
react by distributing more dividends than is socially optimal. Reducing the
capital gains tax may improve the entrepreneurs incentive and improve the
dividends decision.
We solve the model by backward induction.
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Year 2 dividend. The entrepreneurs decision depends on whether the
capital gains tax rate is higher or lower than then ordinary income rate. If
it is higher then the entrepreneur will prefer dividends; otherwise he prefers
capital gain (it is assumed for simplicity that assets can be freely sold without
value loss so the dividends can be as high as the rms value).
Let V2 be the rms value at the beginning of year 2 (after earnings from
the project are realized but before dividends are determined). Let V1 be the
cost of shares for the entrepreneur (it a¤ects the capital gains tax). If the
entrepreneur holds shares until year 2 then V1 = 0. If the entrepreneur sells
shares at the end of year 1 then V1 is the rms value at that moment. In the
latter case the rm has a new decision-maker at year 2 (new shareholders)
because the shares were sold at year 1 end (this fact does not a¤ect the
derivations below). When making year 2 dividend decision, the entrepreneur
(or new shareholders) maximizes: W2 = d2(1 td)+(V2 d2) maxf(V2 d2 
V1); 0gtc. This means that dividends are taxed with the rate td, the remained
value of the rm is V2   d2. The entrepreneurs capital gain is V2   d2   V1
and this amount will be taxed with tax rate tc.
Lemma 1. If V2 > V1, and tc  td, d2 = V2   V1, W2 = (V2   V1)(1  
td) + V1. If tc < td, then d2 = 0 and W2 = V2   (V2   V1)tc. If V2 < V1,
d2 = 0, W2 = V2   (V2   V1)tc.
Proof. The proof is rather technical so it is delegated to the Appendix.
Now consider the managers investment decision. Let e = c   w   d1
(retained cash after year 1 equal initial cash minus dividend payment and
salary payment). The manager maximizes the sum of private benets and
bonus paid at year 2: WM = b+ ar(c  d1   b).
@WM
@b
= 1  ar0(i) (3)
It follows from (1) and (3) that if a = 1, the manager retains 100% of
earnings from the socially e¢ cient project and hence the rst-best level of
investment is achieved. In this case however, the manager has positive rent
(i.e. his budget constraint is not binding) by (2) because r(i) > w0. If a < 1,
the manager underinvests because from (3) r0(i) = 1=a > 1. Thus i < i.
The following lemma summarizes the above analysis.
Lemma 2. If a = 1, i = i. If a < 1 and r0(e)  1=a, r0(i) = 1=a. If
r0(e) < 1=a, i = e.
Next let us analyze the entrepreneur decision about selling shares at
the end of year 1 (after the year 1 dividends are paid and before managers
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make investment decision). This depends on whether the dividend tax rate
is higher or lower than the capital gain(s) tax rate. Without formal proof,
the entrepreneurs decision can be described as follows. If the entrepreneur
does not sell shares then by Lemma 1 (given that V1 = 0), the entrepreneur
earnings are either (1   a)r(i)(1   td) or (1   a)r(i)(1   tc), depending on
whether tc is greater or less than td (i is determined by Lemma 2). If the
entrepreneur sells shares at the end of year 1. The rms value at the end of
year 1 is (1 a)r(i) (again i is determined by Lemma 2). Outside investor will
be willing to pay this amount since the rms value in year 2 after completing
the project will be equal to the same amount so they can resell the rm for
this amount without incurring any capital gain tax. The entrepreneur selling
shares get thus (1   a)r(i)(1   tc). Comparing this with the case when he
retains shares until year 2 we conclude that if dividend tax is lower then the
entrepreneur earnings are (1  a)r(i)(1  td) (the entrepreneur does not sell
shares). Otherwise it is (1   a)r(i)(1   tc) (he is indi¤erent between either
decision).
Thus we have the following result.
Lemma 3. If tc  td, the entrepreneur does not sell shares and W2 =
(1   a)r(i)(1   td). If tc < td, the entrepreneur sells shares and V1 =
(1  a)r(i)(1  tc).
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us now turn to the rst-period dividend decision.
if tc > td then the entrepreneurs earnings W equal W1 +W2 = d1(1  
td) + (1  a)r(i)(1  td).
@W
@d1
= 1 + (1  a)r0(i) @i
@d1
(4)
if tc  td then W = d1(1  td) + (1  a)r(i)(1  tc).
@W
@d1
= 1  td + (1  a)r0(i) @i
@d1
(1  tc) (5)
Note that in the rst case the managers objective function does not
depend on tc and from (4) and (5) the rst case is equivalent to the second
case when tc = td. So we just ignore the rst case and analyze the second
case.
Two situations may exist. 1. When d1 < c   w   i, where i  i(a)
is such that
r0(i) = 1=a (6)
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we have by Lemma 2 @i
@d1
= 0. This means that if the managers has enough
funds to cover investment i he will invest this amount in the e¢ cient project
(by Lemma 2). Anticipating this, the entrepreneur distributes as much divi-
dends as possible just to leave the amount i for investment and not leaving
any private benets for the manager: d1 = c   w   i ( @i@d1 = 0 implies by
(5) that @W
@d1
= 1  td > 0) and hence b = 0.
2. When d1 > c  w   i, we have by Lemma 2 i = e or i = c  w   d1.
Thus @i
@d1
=  1; @W
@d1
= 1 td (1 a)r0(i)(1 tc) and b = 0. Let i  i(a)
such that
r0(i) =
1  td
(1  a)(1  tc) (7)
and let d1 = c  w   i.
If 1=a > 1 td
(1 a)(1 tc) then i
 > i, d1 < d

1 = c   w   i. We thus
have @W
@d1
< 0, 8d1 > c w  i implying corner solution d1 = c w  i. If
1=a < 1 td
(1 a)(1 tc) then i
 < i, d1 > d

1 = c   w   i and we thus have
an interior optimum d1 = c  w   i.
Lemma 4. If 1=a  1 td
(1 a)(1 tc) then d1 = c w  i. If 1=a < 1 td(1 a)(1 tc)
then d1 = c  w   i.
The intuition behind this result is following. The managers contract
shapes not only the managers incentive but also those of entrepreneur. Ac-
cording to (5), the entrepreneur preference point for investments is i. This
however cannot be implemented directly since the decision is taken by a self-
interested manager. The manager prefers i if it has funds or he will invests
as much as possible. If i > i, the entrepreneur cannot induce i and
thus he will stick with i. Otherwise he will induce i.
Now consider optimal contract for the manager.
The entrepreneurs problem is to design the managers contract and to
choose d to maximize his expected payo¤.
max
w;a
W (8)
where
W =
 (c  w   i(a))(1  td) + (1  a)r(i)(1  tc),if 1=a  1 td
(1 a)(1 tc)
(c  w   i(a))(1  td) + (1  a)r(i)(1  tc),
if 1=a < 1 td
(1 a)(1 tc)
(9)
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subject to
w + ar(i)  w0, if 1=a  1 td(1 a)(1 tc)
w + ar(i)  w0, if 1=a < 1 td(1 a)(1 tc)
(10)
Note that in (9) the rst-period dividend (by Lemma 4) is either c w 
i(a) or c  w   i(a). From (9):
@W
@a
=
  ia (a)(1  td) + (1  a)r0(i)ia (a)(1  tc)  r(i)(1  tc),if 1=a  1 td
(1 a)(1 tc)
 ia (a)(1  td) + (1  a)r0(i)ia (a)(1  tc)  r(i)(1  tc),
if 1=a < 1 td
(1 a)(1 tc)
Using (7):
@W
@a
=
  ia (a)(1  td) + (1  a)r0(i)ia (a)(1  tc)  r(i)(1  tc),
if 1=a  1 td
(1 a)(1 tc)
 r(i)(1  tc), if 1=a < 1 td(1 a)(1 tc)
(11)
The only candidate for optimal a is a  1 tc
2 td tc (this is equivalent to 1=a 
1 td
(1 a)(1 tc)). Proof by contradiction. Suppose that optimal a >
1 tc
2 td tc . Two
cases are possible. If the managers budget constraint is not binding, one can
reduce a that improves the entrepreneurs earnings by (11). If its binding
then a reduction in a increases investment by Lemma 4 and (7) and taking
into account the concavity of r(i). This increases the total payo¤of entrepre-
neur and manager. The entrepreneur will adjust w to satisfy the managers
budget constraint.
Thus only the case a  1 tc
2 td tc can be a candidate for optimal a (by
continuity). We have (see, for instance, Varian (1992), ch.27)):
sign
@a
@td
= sign
@2W
@a@td
= signfia (a)g
The latter is positive by (6). Indeed, by di¤erentiating both parts of (6) in
a we get
r00(i j i = i)ia (a) =  1=a2
The concavity of r(i) implies that i(a) is increasing. This inturn implies
that @a
@td
> 0. Since an increase in td increases a, this leads to higher i
8
and higher amount of investment by Lemma 4. This leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. An increase in td is socially e¢ cient.
3 Conclusion.
This note has analyzed optimal dividend policy and investment decision in
a model where a rms manager is subject to moral hazard and has ability
to invest in socially ine¢ cient projects. It is shown that equilibrium level
of investment is below socially optimally since the entrepreneur distributes
too much dividends to reduce the managers entrenchment problem. By
increasing the dividend tax rate over capital gain tax rate, social planner
can improve the equilibrium level of investment by giving more incentive to
entrepreneur to retain funds inside the rm.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Two cases are possible. Case 1: V2   d2 > V1. Then
@W2
@d2
= tc   td
If tc > td then d2 = V2   V1. Otherwise d2 = 0. High dividends will be paid
if dividend tax rate is smaller than capital tax rate and no dividends will be
paid otherwise. Case 2. V2   d2 < V1. Then
@W2
@d2
=  td
Then d2 = maxf0; V2   V1g. Finally we have. If V2 > V1, and tc > td,
d2 = V2   V1. If tc < td, then compare d2 = 0 and d2 = V2   V1. In the rst
case W2 = V2   (V2   V1)tc. In the second case W2 = (V2   V1)(1  td) + V1.
First case is better for the entrepreneur. Finally, if V2 < V1, d2 = 0. End
proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. First suppose that the entrepreneur does not sell
shares. Then by Lemma 1 (given that V1 = 0), if tc > td the entrepreneurs
earnings are W2 = (1   a)r(i)(1   td). Otherwise it is (1   a)r(i)(1   tc),
where i is determined by Lemma 2.
Now suppose that the entrepreneur sells shares at the end of year 1. What
is the value of the rm then?
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Recall that V1 is the value of the rm in this case. We have V2 = (1  
a)r(i), where i is determined by Lemma 2. Suppose V1  V2. If tc > td, then
by Lemma 1 d2 = V2   V1 and the new shareholderspayo¤ (buying shares
from the entrepreneur) is Wn = V1 + (V2   V1)(1  td). This should be equal
to V1. Thus we have V1 = V2 = (1   a)r(i). If tc < td then d2 = 0 and
Wn = V2   (V2   V1)tc. Thus V1 = V2   (V2   V1)tc or V1 = V2(1 tc)1 tc = V2.
Now suppose that V1 > V2. This situation is impossible because no one will
be willing to buy the shares of the rm at the end of year 1. To summarize:
at the end of year 1 the rms value is (1  a)r(i), where i = c  d1  w  b.
If the entrepreneur sells shares at the end of year 1 he gets (1 a)r(i)(1 
tc). End proof.
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